

# The Impact of the Navy on the Athenian Democracy and the Economy during the Fourth Century BCE: Signs of ailment or of well-being? (Preliminary Paper)

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## INTRODUCTION

This paper is based on the following contention. The firm link made by some of our sources between the navy and democracy in Athens—particularly its central tenet that poor citizens obtained political privileges because they became the dominant segment in the navy—is a notion mainly created and kept alive by ideology, popular or otherwise. Accordingly, modern historians who emphasise the historical import of that link ought to make it clear that they are specifically describing contemporary *beliefs* about how a form of constitution (democracy) and a sector of the military (the navy) interacted, and with which socio-political effects. Outside the field of ideology, however, a strong navy-democracy connection is only to be found in a wholly different and still insufficiently recognised area; one, in which the prevailing institutions were economic rather than political, and in which the dominant population segment were Athens' wealthy citizens. I am referring to the area of naval finance. In short, contrary to what has been claimed, the classical Athenian trireme never was a school of democracy. If anything, the Athenian trireme was the great transformer of a whole social class, from being fiscally unburdened warriors in Archaic times to becoming tax-payers and military functionaries in Classical times. Neither the profusion of honours, nor the—always limited—political privileges that accrued to members of that class could conceal the radically changed circumstances that

they had to face in the fifth and fourth centuries. Yet, as it will be argued here, in the fourth century, these 'honourable tax-payers' re-entered the field of independent economic action.

Democracy, as an ideology and as a set of institutions, was only partially the factor that had endowed the trireme with such a consequential capability. The particular trajectory followed by Athens as a *state* played at least an equal part. That trajectory enriched Athens with institutions that identified it first and foremost as a type of *state* (or *polis*) and then as a type of democracy. Most decisive for this process was the influence of three intersecting and nearly contemporary decisions, all concentrated within the period from 483/2 to 478/7 BC. One: to make the navy Athens' principal institution of violence. Two: to make this institution of violence the exclusive possession of the state (i.e. Athens' assumption of violence monopoly), following which all decisions concerning the navy became the preserve of the supreme bodies of government. And three: to become the leader of a hegemonic alliance. The threesome **naval power, monopoly of violence** at sea and **hegemony** was immediately, or shortly after, joined by a fourth trait that left its imprint on almost every single known institutional development or innovation which occurred in the fifth and fourth centuries, and which was related to the fields of resource acquisition and military finance: **centralisation**. If you agree with me that 'tribute' (*phoros*) is another word for 'tax', though one implying a relationship of domination between two polities, then Athens was definitely a centralised 'Tax State' (*Steuerstaat*) by 454/3 BC. Known major adjustments of the overall fiscal profile date from *c.* 428 (first significant levy of *eisphora*, Thuc. 3.19.1; heavy

liturgical burdens: [Xen.] *Ath.Pol.* 1.13), and again from 414 (replacement of *phoros* with the *eikoste*, the 5% tax on empire-wide trade: Thuc. 7.28.4-5).

Following the defeat of 404, the system settled on its fourth-century level of almost total reliance on domestic capital, extracted through the liturgies, the *eisphora*, the *proeisphora* and occasionally the *epidoseis*; for the new external fiscal base, the allied *syntaxeis*, proved ineffective, to say the least. It is especially in the fiscal area that the two aspects of Athens— Athens *the state* and Athens *the democracy*—coalesced into one, inseparable entity that determined (a) the **magnitude of the resource** (including that in coin) that was needed; and (b) **who** was to pay (for) it, **how often** and **in which way**. Moreover, the same entity let the relationship between the navy and those responsible for its operation and finance be defined by governmentally imposed obligations, with potentially severe limitations on the latter's independent field of action— economic and military—as the result. Thus, in the fourth century, the Athenian economic upper-class, the descendants of a once fiscally unburdened class of warriors, toiled to surmount constraints that issued from three areas: state **centralism**, state **monopoly** of violence and the demands of **the democratic *Steuerstaat***.

Provided that the contention with which I opened this paper is accepted, *how did the features just mentioned influence the organisation, operation and finance of the navy which Athens rebuilt in the fourth century?* Additionally, *what was the impact of this 'new navy' on the democracy and the economy?* These are the principal question I shall essay to answer in the following. Here I offer suggestions for discussion, not in-depth analysis or final results.

## THE 'NEW NAVY' OF THE FOURTH CENTURY

Compared to the fifth century, the fourth century offers a far richer source material on our topic. For one we have the corpus of Attic oratory. For another, and in particular, we have the preserved fragments of the yearly accounts drawn up by the naval officials in the Piraeus, the *epimeletai ton neorion*. These fragments belong to the inscriptions known as the Naval Catalogues or the Naval Records. The first extant fourth-century fragment dates from 378/7 BC, the last from 323/2 BC. A few, small fragments from the fifth century indicate that such record-keeping was practised also before 404 BC. I will not describe here in detail this extremely useful but daunting source material, but I will be happy to answer any questions that might be raised about it in our ensuing discussion.

In combination, our literary sources and inscriptions show the 'new navy' to be in constant growth. A direct measure of that growth is the steadily increasing number of ships. [SLIDE. 1] The figures for individual years are as follows: slightly over **100** ships in 378/7; **283** ships in 357/6; **349** in 353/2; **410** in 330/29; and **417** in 325/4. So, by 350 BC Athens had regained its fifth-century, imperial potential. [SLIDE 2] Growth is also documented by the gradual expansion of the land-based facilities in the three naval bases of the Piraeus. In addition to fortification work, more ship sheds and more storehouses came to be built especially around 330; [SLIDE 3] most notable among these structures is Philon's *Skeuotheke* (naval store) at the harbour of Zea. Moreover, equipment for one hundred triremes was to be stored in the *Opisthodomos* on the Acropolis. To the indications of Athens' continuing naval pre-eminence, we should finally add the unfailing ability of the city to dispatch—throughout the century and to various fields of operations—smaller squadrons as well as large fleets.

All these features may therefore lead one to infer that the *nautikon*, not only had become again a thriving institution; it was also a well-functioning institution, capable of executing the decisions of the Athenian democracy. A closer inspection of the evidence, however, reveals potentially alarming shortcomings in particularly two vital areas: (1) manpower recruitment; and (2) possession of sufficient and serviceable equipment with which to fit out the fleet. My treatment of each of these here can only be sketchy.

### *CREWING THE TRIREMES*

Our fourth-century sources indicate that state conscription of crews was a rarely used procedure. One particular text shows it also to have been an ineffective procedure. That text is Pseudo-Demosthenes 50, *Against Polykles*. [SLIDE 4]. Being among the trierarchs of a fleet ordered to sail to the North Aegean in 362, Apollodoros (son of Pasion) experienced the following with the oarsmen conscripted to man his trireme (50.7):

ἐγὼ δ' ἐπειδὴ μοι οὐκ ἤλθον οἱ ναῦται οἱ καταλεγέντες ὑπὸ τῶν δημοτῶν, ἀλλ' ἢ ὀλίγοι καὶ οὗτοι ἀδύνατοι, τούτους μὲν ἀφῆκα, ὑποθεὶς δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν ἑμαυτοῦ καὶ δανεισάμενος ἀργύριον πρῶτος ἐπληρωσάμην τὴν ναῦν, μισθωσάμενος ναύτας ὡς οἶόν τ' ἦν ἀρίστους, δωρεὰς καὶ προδόσεις δοὺς ἐκάστῳ αὐτῶν μεγάλας. ἔτι δὲ σκεύεσιν ἰδίῳ τὴν ναῦν ἅπανσι κατεσκεύασα, καὶ τῶν δημοσίων ἔλαβον οὐδέν.

Since only few of the oarsmen who had been listed by the *demotai* to serve came to me [*sc.* to Apollodoros' ship in Piraeus], and those few who did come were unfit, I dismissed them. And having mortgaged my property in order to borrow money, I was the first to man the ship, hiring the best oarsmen to be had by giving to each man large bonuses and advance payments. More than that, I equipped the ship

with equipment that was entirely my own possession, receiving not a single item from that owned by the state.

This passage, and the rest of the speech, support five important points. The first concerns the difference—qualitative as well as quantitative—existing between the manpower provided by the state (which was both inadequate and unfit); and the manpower hired in private from the labour market in the Piraeus (which was plentiful and highly skilled); besides oarsmen (*nautai*), we should note, Apollodoros hired the ship's officers and deck-hands (*hyperesia*) at his own expense.

The second point takes its start from the observation that most, or many, of Apollodoros' hired men were Athenian citizens. The point itself is, however, that one and the same population segment, the *citizens*, had a strong presence in both modes of manpower supply, i.e. state conscription and the market for martial labour. This, in turn, seems to translate into a clear preference—by some Athenian citizens, at least—for service on a trireme as a market-regulated employment, over service as a citizen duty. This same preference is further evidenced by the fact that, during the campaign, Apollodoros' trireme was hit by mass desertion three times: once while briefly back in Piraeus, once while in the Hellespont and once after a risky operation off Stryme. Each time he had to hire fresh crews (11-12; 14, with 17-18; and 23), and each time the motive of desertion was a private-economic one, the crew's demand of higher rates of pay. Incidentally, Apollodoros' experiences provide an important corrective to our current method of calculating the manpower requirements of fleets: usually, a trireme had indeed a complement of 200 at the moment of departure from its

home harbour; but the total number of men who *had done service* on that ship during a whole campaign might be three times as large.

The fourth point is that Apollodoros' case seemingly was exceptional only as regards the magnitude of his expenditure, but not the ways that expenditure had come about. For also the other trierarchs in his fleet had hired crews that included citizens (16, with 34-35), and these trierarchs, too, were inflicted by desertions, even though perhaps to a lesser degree (15-16; 34-35). (See also Dem. 21.154: '... hired crews for the ships by ourselves').

My fifth and final point is that, despite all the difficulties that Apollodoros encountered, which include the refusal of his successor trierarch to relieve him in time; and despite the fact that his crew showed a greater interest in their private economic gain than in being schooled in democracy, his ship did perform quite well: Apollodoros was honoured by the *demos* with an *epainos* and an invitation to dinner at the Prytaneion (13); and the fleet of which his ship was part did carry out its various assignments (4-6).

On this background, one may therefore ask: is it after all appropriate to regard this situation as an alarming shortcoming? Where is the dysfunction, really? Well, it is to be found in the unwillingness of democratic ideology, especially the part of it that exalted 'the *thranites* folk, the saviours of our city' (Ar. *Ach.* 161-162), to reconcile itself with the reality that the celebrated *epistemones tes thalasses/tou nautikou* (Thuc. 1.142.5-9; 8.45.2) were often inclined to turn their back on their duties as *politai/demotai*, in favour of the attractions offered by employment as *misthophoroi*. In the real world, however, no such conflict gave cause for grievance: as long as Apollodoros and his peers were meeting the

demands of Athens the Tax State and Athens the democracy, everything functioned satisfactorily. Their payments were not merely towards the fulfilment of an obligation; they were also huge investments in the security of their ship and in their own personal advancement, *economic* advancement included.

One could, of course, still say in the 360s that the *nautikos ochlos* ‘made democracy stronger’ (Aristotle’s words for post-480 developments: *Pol.* 1304a21-24). But in that case, what one would likely refer to—wittingly or not—is the outcome of a labour market transaction, rather than of a lofty political mission. In practice, trierarchs and naval manpower transacted like private employers and employees.

It is time now to look at the second potentially alarming shortcoming, that concerning the amount and quality of ship’s equipment in the dockyards.

### *EQUIPPING THE TRIREMES*

The rosy picture given by the increasing number of Athenian trireme hulls becomes less rosy when one looks at the equipment needed to make these ships serviceable. **[SLIDE 5]** In 357/6, for example, Athens had 283 trireme hulls. However, only a percentage of these hulls could be fitted out with a complete set of serviceable equipment. The table on my slide 5 shows the various percentages in individual years and for the separate items of ‘wooden’ and ‘hanging’ equipment; as can be seen, the situation is discouraging. To take another example, in 326/5 BC, the total number of hulls was 360, but there were complete sets of oars for only 82.5%, and main masts for 60.8% of these hulls. **[SLIDE 6]** The picture remains the same when we look at what is at hand and



what is lacking in a single harbour, here at Mounichia (the smallest of the three harbours), which in 353/2 accommodated 39 triremes.

The conclusion seems certain, therefore, that during our entire period the Athenian navy suffered from a serious imbalance between the size of the fleet on paper and the size of the fleet in reality. We actually happen to have good evidence to show what had created that imbalance. It was the pervasive practice of naval officials and trierarchs to retain public equipment in their possession, quite often in large quantities and for considerable periods of time. Here, I curtail detailed discussion of the evidence by referring to my treatment of this topic elsewhere (Gabrielsen 1994, 149-57). It is, however, crucial to understand this practice as part of a larger phenomenon. Three points are immediately relevant.

The first is that a substantial amount of the equipment that was missing from the dockyards was not just kept idle by those who retained it, naval officials or trierarchs; it was currently used by them, though in a rather unofficial way: often they made it available, probably in return for a sum of money, to those ship captains who, for one reason or another, did not wish to have any formal or direct dealing with the naval administration ([Dem.] 47.20). Consequently, important transactions concerning the navy were taking place outside the official channels, or even surreptitiously in the private sphere. The period of time in which some naval officials had public equipment in their possession is revealed by the recorded details of the large-scale effort launched by the state to recover that material in the years 346/5 to 342/1: a large part of that equipment had been owing since 378/7 BC, i.e. for thirty years (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1622.379-579).

Of even greater significance, however, was a related practice: instead of returning the public equipment in their possession to the dockyards, many withholders chose to compensate for it by paying its monetary value to the state. They thereby became the legal owners of what they had been misappropriating over a series of years. In his capacity as *epimeletes ton norion*, probably in 356, one Satyros is said to have collected 34 T (204,000 dr) from individuals owing public equipment (Dem. 22.63); with a complete set valued at 2,169 dr., the 34 T correspond to the equipment for 94 triremes. To this we should add the sheer *amount* of material withheld by certain individuals: a naval official of 346/5, Mnesikles Kollyteus, withheld equipment belonging to eighteen ships, the equivalent of half of the force stationed in Mounichia (1622.420-31); one Euthymachos, treasurer of the neoria in 347/6, withheld, among other items, mainsails for 35 and anchors for 34 ships (68 anchors: 1622.446-77), while Kephisodoros Kydathenaieus, tamias of the dockyards in 325/4, withheld equipment for no fewer than 10 triremes (1631.350-403).

My second point is that this phenomenon is intimately connected with another one, which is independently documented by our evidence: that is, the possession and use by a large number of trierarchs of their own equipment. Particularly interesting are the entries in the naval records which lists equipment on a ship under the formula 'someone introduced' (*eisenegken*). With this formula the superintendents of the dockyards were noting the fact that, in order to cover current shortages in public equipment, individuals had given their private equipment on loan to the state (e.g. 1609, with V. Gabrielsen, *ZPE* 79 (1989) 93-99; 98 (1993) 175-183). Our literary sources corroborate this large-scale private possession of ships' equipment. Apollodoros, we have seen, used his own set and so did his syntrierarch-colleague Hagnias ([Dem.] 50.7, 42); the same

was the case with two other individuals—the speaker of [Dem.] 51 (at 5) and that of [Dem.]47 (at 23). That we have to do with a quite widespread practice is, moreover, implied by a resolution of 357/6: Chairedemos' decree (passed in response to a current shortage) orders those owning ship's equipment to sell it to the state ([Dem.]47.20, 44). Certainly, several of these individuals would have purchased their sets from an otherwise well-supplied market in the Piraeus ([Dem.]47.20). Indeed, Makartatos son of Apolexis, we are told, had purchased a whole trireme, though one which he used outside the Athenian *nautikon* (Is. 11.48).

My third and final point follows directly from the preceding ones. From the 370s onwards, the Athenian trierarchic class had invested massively in naval material, and a major motivation for that investment almost certainly was the wish to obtain relative independence from public control: that is, a relative relief both from the fiscal demands of the *Steuerstaat*; and from the requirement of the violence-monopolistic Athenian democracy that their martial skills and wealth be made to serve only communal, not private, interests. More importantly, in doing so, the same class gradually but systematically was turning an entirely *state-owned* fleet into a partly *privately-owned* fleet. As a consequence, those responsible for commanding and financing the fleet were slowly eroding the very monopoly of violence at sea which had been the figurehead of the centralised Tax State (but not necessarily of democracy) uninterruptedly at least since 483/2 BC.

How far had the erosion advanced? Apollodoros and others, we have seen, were themselves hiring and paying their crews, in addition to using their private equipment. Their independence had thus come that far. But the ban that Athens

continued to enforce (a) on the use of privately-owned hulls *within* the Athenian naval establishment and (b) on the use of public hulls *for private* purposes left no room for near as much independent action, especially economic action, of the kind that was characteristic of the naval champions of the Persian Wars, Kleinius son of Alkibiades in particular (Hdt. 8.17).

### *THE NAVY AND THE ECONOMY*

Yet, where there is a will, there is a way. Meidias (Kephisodorou Anagyrasios) broke out of the fleet and used his warship to transport home vine-props, cattle, framed doors and timber from Styra on Euboia (Dem. 21.167). This, however, was a slight transgression compared to what Androtion (Andronos Gargettios) and his co-ambassadors did, while sailing on a mission to Mausolus in 355: together with the trierarchs on their trireme they assaulted a merchantman on high seas, looting it for cargo worth 57,000 dr. (Dem. 24.11-14; cf. Dem. 24 hyp. i. 2-3; hyp. ii. 1-3). Even more questionable—because of the reprisals that it could provoke and because of the sheer magnitude of the practice—was the systematic raiding and seizure of persons conducted by those who hired trierarchies from the formally appointed trierarchs, presumably a sizeable group that remains anonymous in our record ([Dem.]51.13-14, with Schol. to Dem. 21.80; Dem. 21.155). These and further such instances of unauthorized use of public warships for private (and so illegal) purposes did constitute another way in which the state's monopoly of violence was challenged, but, even though the practice was looked upon with vexation, actually little was done to terminate its occurrence.

Seemingly, tolerance was shown for two reasons: (1) especially after 411, the raid had become a favoured tactical concept, thus placing a high premium on proficiency in it; in the fourth century, those proficient in raiding were therefore indispensable for realising their state three highly prioritised financial expedients: plunder, extortion and the sale of protection to traders—the main way in which Athens tried to cope with the inadequacy of allied *syntaxeis*; and (2) private profits from independent or semi-independent action at sea were seen by the Tax State as an equally welcome source of revenue.

In addition, opportunity for private economic action arose whenever those captaining the fleet were able to couple the fleet's preoccupation with *sitopompeia*, and thus the fleet's almost constant presence at the sources of grain supply, with their personal economic interests, whether as moneylenders, members of tax-farming syndicates or investors in trade. Frequent contact with various places of supply or re-shipment offered warship captains clear advantages regarding access to information crucial to the conduct of trade in grain. Not only information about prices, currency and availability of supplies at various *emporía*; but also about port facilities, infrastructural services for speedy expedition, legal regulations regarding conflict settlement, taxation and locally applying privileges, including that of tax-exemption. Merchants better informed on these matters had the advantage over their competitors of being able to deal with the asymmetry of information and lessen their transaction costs. Furthermore, if the 180 or so grain-carrying merchantmen exiting the Black Sea in 340 BC were each operating on a 3,000 dr. loan (Dem. 35.10), and if the figures for ships and loan were within the annual average, then the capital that had to be raised yearly in the Piraeus to finance Athens' grain trade with *that part of the world only* (which reportedly counted for half of a year's total

imports: Dem. 20.31) amounted to 90 talents (540,000 dr.). There is no way in which capital of that magnitude could be raised on a yearly basis without a substantial contribution from the trierarchic class.

**[SLIDE 7]** Nor is it realistic to suppose that the costs of maintaining and operating the fleet—my estimates of which are given here for three individual years—could have been borne without at least one-third of the yearly totals to have constituted the contribution of the trierarchic class. And that one-third constituted the part of that class's economic gains that went to finance the navy only.

Space for independent economic action, as the following example may show, could be created both within the confines of the monopolistic state and, indeed, with a beneficial outcome for Athens the democracy. I am referring to the Grain Fund scheme introduced in 326/5 BC by a decree of Demades (Demeou Paianieus: *IG II<sup>2</sup> 1628.339-51*). The essentials of the scheme are as follows: a number of debtor-trierarchs were each permitted to defray his debt partly by paying a sum of money himself and partly by enlisting the financial assistance of a group of persons. At the same time, the debtors were permitted to reckon against their naval debt contributions to the Grain Fund made by themselves and by their helpers. Rather than attacking the debtor-trierarchs, Demades seems to have been assisting them, for he allowed them to meet two obligations (i.e. clearance of a naval debt and an *epidosis* contribution to the Grain Fund) by paying the sum relating to one obligation (the naval debt). Moreover, through this scheme Demades and the entire group were feeding the Grain Fund with money that properly belonged to the navy; private economic concerns may explain their rerouting of part of their naval contributions to precisely that area.

This and further pieces of evidence suggest that, as members of a larger network and smaller cabals, individuals from the trierarchic class shared common financial interests, and in their pursuit of these interests they united political/military functions with maintenance of private portfolios of diversified economic concerns.

An illustrative example is provided by Androtion: (i) author of a local history of Athens (*Atthis*); (ii) author of a book of *Georgika*, suggesting that his property was in farm land (*APF* p. 33); (iii) proposer of grain-trade related decrees for Bosporan rulers (*IG II<sup>2</sup> 212 = RO 64*); (iv) politician for over thirty years (*Dem.* 22.66; 24.173); (v) raider of merchantmen; and (vi) governor of, and big-time benefactor-cum-moneylender in, Arkesine on Amorgos (*Syll.*3, 193).

Besides moving effortlessly from politics to business and back again, Androtion and other members of his class had hardly their economic interests confined to a single area, the grain-trade (whether as financiers, wholesalers or middlemen closing deals and dispatching shipments). Nor did their bonding take place in a single institutional venue, but was nursed through the technique of **syndication**, i.e. membership of various criss-crossing groups: *hetaireiai*, *koina* of *eranistai*, tax-farming or grain-transporting consortia, trierarchic symmories, ad hoc mutual-aid-mutual-profit schemes conceived by a network member, etc. Syndication encouraged and widened participation in capital-raising endeavours, while group loyalty, besides offering the advantage of reducing risk among the shareholders, resulted in capital sums which could go beyond the economic capability of all except the super-rich.

One specimen from a larger repertoire of examples will suffice here. A law intended to protect Androtion (Dem. 24.26) during his trial about the looting of the merchantman was proposed by Timokrates (Antiphontos Krioieus), Androtion's close associate in public life (Dem. 22.66; 24.160, 173). Timokrates' son, Polyeuktos, was also connected to Androtion: he proposed the rider to the decree honouring the Bosphoran rulers. Now, both Timokrates and his son Polyeuktos were among the very rich Athenians (and trierarchs), who during the trial for which Dem. 21 was written were expected to speak in support of Meidias. [SLIDE 8] The others members of the group were: Diotimos (Diopethou Euonymeus), Mnesarchides (Mnesarchou Halaieus Araph.), Neoptolemos (Antikleous Meliteus), Philippides (Philomelou Paianieus), Euktemon Lousieus (nicknamed 'the dusty') and Blepaios the Banker (Dem. 21.103, 139, 208, 215). Three things should be noted:

First, the whole group formed or was part of a 'comrades' club', an *hetaireia*.

Second, Blepaios the Banker, who at a meeting of the assembly had tried to bribe Demosthenes on behalf of a friend (Dem. 21.215-216), is almost certainly the Blepaios who leads a group of *eranistai* featuring as creditors on a security *horos*: *hoi eranistai hoi meta Blepaiou* (Agora 19 H94) In c.347, Blepaios the Banker lent a sum of money to Mantitheos and his father Mantias Thorikios to buy a mining concession (or property in the mines: Dem.40.52)

Third, three persons from this group—Diotimos, Neoptolemos and Philippides—were also among the debtor-trierarchs and financial helpers in Demades Grain Fund scheme.



## CONCLUSION (preliminary)

Are these signs of ailment or of well-being? Major changes in the way the navy was organised, financed and run in the fourth century did have an impact on Athens *the state*, in as much as they challenged both its tendency for institutional centralism and its time-honoured monopoly of violence at sea. That challenge came from those responsible for financing and captaining the ships and represented the price which the state had to pay in return for their increased monetary contributions in the fourth century. As a result, the members of the trierarchic class, while remaining tax-payers and military functionaries, succeeded in increasing their opportunities for pursuing and expanding their private economic interests. Syndication—i.e. the articulation of action through membership of various criss-crossing groups of mutual assistance—was a principal means through which that class cultivated their diversified portfolios of political and economic concerns.

Yet, the private economic gains accruing therefrom contributed substantially to the finance of Athens' navy; indeed, private cash did not just help to keep that navy afloat; it maintained it in top condition at all times. As long as the navy remained Athens' principal institution of violence, all this definitely benefited Athens *the democracy* and its brain-child, Athens *the Tax State*. No dysfunction or conflict is in evidence throughout the fourth century in the relationship between the navy and the institutions of democracy. Through their personal involvement in business and politics, and through their naval expenditure, Apollodoros, Meidias, Androtion, Demades and other less well-known figures

did in fact much to energise the Athenian democracy and to serve its interest. 'Bad citizens' and 'artful tax-dodgers' is Matthew Christ's characterisation of this class of people (Christ 2006). I would rather call them 'the creative class' of the Athenian democracy and of the Athenian economy.